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Abstract Most of the world’s power grids are controlled remotely. Their
control messages are sent over potentially insecure channels, driving
the need for an authentication mechanism. The main communication
mechanism for power grids and other utilities is defined by an IEEE
standard, referred to as DNP3; this includes the Secure Authentication v5
(SAv5) protocol, which aims to ensure that messages are authenticated.
We provide the first security analysis of the complete DNP3: SAv5 pro-
tocol. Previous work has considered the message-passing sub-protocol of
SAv5 in isolation, and considered some aspects of the intended security
properties. In contrast, we formally model and analyse the complex com-
position of the protocol’s three sub-protocols. In doing so, we consider
the full state machine, and the possibility of cross-protocol attacks. Fur-
thermore, we model fine-grained security properties that closely match
the standard’s intended security properties. For our analysis, we leverage
the Tamarin prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols.
Our analysis shows that the core DNP3: SAv5 design meets its intended
security properties. Notably, we show that a previously reported attack
does not apply to the standard. However, our analysis also leads to several
concrete recommendations for improving future versions of the standard.
1 Introduction
Most of the world’s power grids are are monitored and controlled remotely.
In practice, power grids are controlled by transmitting monitoring and control
messages, between authorised operators (‘users’) that send commands from control
centers (‘master stations’), and substations or remote devices (‘outstations’). The
messages may be passed over a range of different media, such as direct serial
connections, ethernet, Wi-Fi, or un-encrypted radio links. As a consequence, we
cannot assume that these channels guarantee confidentiality or authenticity.
The commands that are passed over these media are critical to the security
of the power grid: they can make changes to operating parameters such as
increases or decreases in voltage, opening or closing valves, or starting or stopping
motors [13]. It is therefore desirable that an adversary in control of one of these
media links should not be able to insert or modify messages. This has motivated
the need for a way to authenticate received messages.
The DNP3 standard, more formally known as IEEE 1815-2012, the “Standard
for Electric Power Systems Communications – Distributed Network Protocol” [3],
is used by most of the world’s power grids for communication, and increasingly
for other utilities such as water and gas.
Secure Authentication version 5 (SAv5) is a new protocol family within DNP3,
and was standardised in 2012 (Chapter 7 of IEEE 1815-2012 [3], based on IEC/TS
62351-5 [4]). SAv5’s goal is to provide authenticated communication between
parties within a utility grid. For example, this protocol allows a substation or
remote device within a utility grid to verify that all received commands were
genuinely sent by an authorised user, that messages have not been modified, and
that messages are not being maliciously replayed from previous commands.
Given the security-critical nature of the power grid, one might expect that
DNP3: SAv5 would have attracted substantial scrutiny. Instead, there has been
very little analysis, except for a few limited works. One possible explanation
is the inherent complexity of the DNP3: SAv5 protocol, as it consists of three
interacting sub-protocols that maintain state to update various keys, which results
in a very complex state machine for each of the participants. Such protocols
are notoriously hard to analyse by hand, and the complex looping constructions
pose a substantial challenge for protocol security analysis tools. Moreover, it
is not sufficient to analyse each sub-protocol in isolation. While this has been
known in theory for a long time [17], practical attacks that exploit cross-protocol
interactions have only been discovered more recently, e.g., [11,19]. In general,
security protocol standards are very hard to get right, e.g. [10, 12,21].
Contributions In this work, we perform the most comprehensive analysis of
the full DNP3 Secure Authentication v5 protocol yet, leveraging automated tools
for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. In particular:
– We provide the first formal models of two of the SAv5 sub-protocols that
had not been modelled previously.
– We provide the first analysis of the complex combination of the three sub-
protocols, thereby considering cross-protocol attacks as well as attacks on
any of the sub-protocols. The security properties that we model capture the
standard’s intended goals in much greater detail than previous works.
– Despite the complexity of the security properties and the protocol, and in
particular its complex state-machine and key updating mechanisms, and
considering unbounded sessions and loop iterations, we manage to verify
the protocol using the Tamarin prover. We conclude that the standard
meets its intended goals if implemented correctly, increasing confidence in
this security-critical building block of many power grids.
– Notably, our findings contradict a claimed result by an earlier analysis; in
particular, our findings show that an attack claimed by other work is not
possible in the standard as defined.
– Our analysis naturally leads to a number of recommendations for improving
future versions of the standard.
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Paper Structure We start by describing the Secure Authentication v5 standard
in Section 2. We describe the sub-protocols’ joint modelling in Section 3, and their
analysis and results in Section 4. We present our recommendations in Section 5,
survey previous analyses of DNP3 in Section 6, before concluding in Section 7.
We further illustrate modelling issues, choices, and examples in the appendices.
2 The DNP3 Standard
The DNP3 standard [3] gives both high level and semi-formal descriptions, to
serve as an implementation guide, as well as providing an informal problem
statement and conformance guidelines. The Secure Authentication v5 protocol
is described in Chapter 7 of [3]. We give an overview of the system and its
sub-protocols, before describing the threat model from SAv5.
2.1 System and Sub-Protocols
There are three types of actor in SAv5: the (single) Authority, the Users
(operating from a Master station), and the Outstations. The Authority decides
who are legitimate users, and generates new (medium-term) Update Keys for
these users. Users send control packets to outstations, who act upon them if they
are successfully authenticated. Outstations send back (similarly authenticated)
monitoring packets. Each user can communicate with multiple outstations, and
each outstation can communicate with multiple users. Users regularly generate
new (short-term) Session Keys for each direction of this communication, and
transport these keys to the outstations. Session keys are distributed and updated
using long-term Authority Keys and medium-term Update keys. These three
different keys are used by three sub-protocols: the Session Key Update protocol,
the Critical ASDU Authentication protocol, and the Update Key Change protocol.
See Figure 1 for an overview of the sub-protocols’ relationships.
Initial Key Distribution: Before any protocols are run, a long-term Authority
Key and an initial medium-term update key must be pre-distributed to each
party. These keys are distributed “over a secure channel” (e.g. via USB stick) to
the respective parties. N.B. Session Keys are not pre-distributed.
The Session Key Update Protocol: Before parties can exchange control or
monitoring messages, the user and outstation must initialise session keys. This
sub-protocol initialises (and later updates) a new, symmetric Session Key for
each communication direction.
After ~15 minutes or ~1,000 critical messages (both configurable) the session
keys will expire. The user and outstation run the Session Key Update Protocol
again, where the user generates fresh symmetric session keys, and sends them
to the outstation, encrypted with their current update key. These session keys
must remain secret, but the secrecy of new keys importantly does not rely on
the secrecy of previous session keys.
All sub-protocols use sequence numbers and freshly generated Challenge Data
with the aim of preventing replay attacks.
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Figure 2. The Session Key Update Pro-
tocol . The labels S1–5 identify the pro-
tocol rules described in Section 2.2.1
The Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol: Outstations use this sub-
protocol to verify that received control packets were genuinely sent by a legitimate
user. Vice-versa, this sub-protocol allows a user to confirm that received mon-
itoring packets were genuinely sent by a legitimate outstation. As this is an
authentication-only protocol, Critical ASDUs are not confidential.
After this sub-protocol’s first execution, the faster ‘Aggressive Mode’ may be
performed: this cuts the non-aggressive mode’s three messages to just one by
sending the ASDU and a keyed HMAC in the same message.
The Update Key Change Protocol: After a longer time, the update key
may expire. The user and outstation (helped by the Authority) will execute the
Update Key Change Protocol . A new update key is created by the Authority, and
sent to both the user and outstation.
2.2 Protocol Descriptions
We now give more detailed descriptions of the three symmetric-key sub-protocols
in Secure Authentication v5. We consider the optional asymmetric mode out
of scope for this analysis. {|m |}sk denotes the symmetric encryption of term m
under key k; similarly HMACk (m) denotes the HMAC of term m keyed by k.
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Figure 4. The Update Key Change Pro-
tocol . The labels U1–7 identify the pro-
tocol rules described in Section 2.2.3.
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2.2.1 Session Key Update Protocol : See Figure 2. This is also the first
sub-protocol run after a system restarts, to initialise the shared session keys.
S1. The user sends a Session Key Status Request. The user moves from “Init” to
the state “Wait for Key Status”.
S2. The outstation generates fresh challenge data CDj , and increments its Key
Change Sequence Number, KSQ. It sends a Session Key Status message
(SKSMj) to the user, containing the KSQ value, user ID, USR, Key Status,
and CDj . The outstation moves from “Start” to the state “Security Idle”.
S3. The user generates two new session keys (one for each direction), CDSK and
MDSK, and sends a Session Key Change Message to the outstation (SKCMj).
This contains the KSQ and USR values, and the encryption of the new keys
and the previously received SKSMj message from the outstation, encrypted
with the current symmetric update key. The user moves to to the state “Wait
for Key Change Confirmation”.
S4. The outstation decrypts this with the shared update key, and checks that
SKSMj is the same as it previously sent. If so, the outstation increments
KSQ, and generates new challenge data, CDj+1; it sends another Session
Key Status Message (this time SKSMj+1), but as session keys have been set,
the message now also includes an HMAC of SKCMj , keyed with the MDSK.
S5. The user verifies that the received HMAC was generated from SKCMj . If so,
the user and outstation start to use the new session keys. If not, the user and
outstation mark the keys as invalid, and retry the protocol. The user state
moves to “Security Idle”.
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2.2.2 Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol : See Figure 3. This is the
main data authentication protocol, and is used to verify the authenticity of
critical ASDUs. This can only run after the first execution of the Session Key
Update Protocol , and it can run in both the control and monitoring directions,
User→Outstation and Outstation→User respectively. Here we present it in the
control direction; the direction determines which key is used for the HMAC in
the final message, i.e. CDSK or MDSK. First, the non-aggressive mode; both
parties start in the state “Security Idle”:
A1. The user sends a critical ASDU, which the outstation must authenticate.
A2. On receipt of this ASDU, the outstation increments its Challenge Sequence
Number, CSQ, and sends an Authentication Challenge (AC), which contains
the user’s ID, USR, fresh challenge data, CD, and the CSQ value. The
outstation moves to the state “Wait for Reply”.
A3. The user sends an Authentication Reply message, which contains the CSQ,
USR, and an HMAC of the previously received Authentication Challenge
message, AC, and the critical ASDU it seeks to authenticate. This HMAC is
keyed with the Control Direction Session Key, CDSK.
A4. The outstation verifies that the HMAC was constructed with the AC message
it sent, the critical ASDU, and keyed with the current CDSK. If it succeeds,
the outstation acts upon this critical ASDU; if it fails, it does not execute it.
Regardless of the outcome, the outstation returns to “Security Idle”.
Aggressive Mode: Once the non-aggressive sub-protocol has run once, the user
may send an Aggressive Mode Request (‘AgRq’ in Figure 3). This contains both
the new ASDU to be authenticated, the incremented CSQ, and an HMAC in the
same message. This HMAC is calculated over the last Authentication Challenge
message the user received, and the entire preceding message it is being sent in.
The outstation then checks (‘AgRcv’ in Figure 3) that the HMAC was con-
structed with the last Authentication Challenge, and that the CSQ is incremented
from the last message. If so, it accepts and acts upon the ASDU.
2.2.3 Update Key Change Protocol : See Figure 4. This allows users and
outstations to change the symmetric update key used by the previous protocol.
Both devices start in “Security Idle”; the outstation always remains here.
U1. The user sends an Update Key Change Request message, containing the
user’s ID, USR, and freshly generated challenge data, CDa. The user moves
to the state “Wait for Update Key Reply”.
U2. Upon receipt of this message, the outstation increments its Key Change
Sequence Number (the same variable as in the previous sub-protocol), and
also generates fresh challenge data, CDb. It sends the new value of KSQ,
USR and CDb to the user in an Update Key Change Reply message.
U3. The user forwards this message on to the Authority.1
U4. The Authority creates a new update key. It encrypts the key, USR, and CDb
with the Authority Key, and transmits it, KSQ, and USR back to the user.
1 U3 and U4 are technically out of scope for DNP3: SAv5.
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U5. The user decrypts this, and forwards both this message (Update Key Change),
and an Update Key Change Confirmation (UKCC) message to the outstation.
This is an HMAC of the user’s full name, both challenge data (CDa and
CDb), KSQ, and USR, and it is keyed with the new update key. The user
moves to the state “Wait for Update Key Confirmation”.
U6. The outstation decrypts the first part of the message to learn the new update
key, and verifies that the UKCC HMAC was created with the correct challenge
data and KSQ from step U2. If so, it sends back its own UKCC message
(also keyed with the new update key), but with the order of the challenge
data swapped, and with its name, rather than the user’s.
U7. If the user can validate this HMAC (by checking that it was created with the
challenge data and KSQ values from this same protocol run, keyed with the
new update key), then it accepts the message, and both parties start to use
the new update keys. If this fails, the parties retry the protocol. Regardless of
outcome (except timeout), the user moves back to the state “Security Idle”.
2.3 Threat Model and Security Properties
In this section we describe how we arrived at the threat model and security prop-
erties that we formally analyse. This is not as straightforward as one might think,
as security properties are often informally and minimally described in protocol
standards. For transparency, we will quote the original standards where possible.
We use colored boxes to denote verbatim quotations from other documents.
The standard has a “Problem description” section [3, p. 13] that describes
“the security threats that this specification is intended to address”. We reproduce
this section in its entirety below:
5.2 Specific threats addressed (from IEEE 1815-2012 [3] p. 13)
This specification shall address only the following security threats, as defined in
IEC/TS 62351-2:
– spoofing;
– modification;
– replay
– eavesdropping — on exchanges of cryptographic keys only, not on other data.
Additionally, the general principles section contains a subsection “Perfect
forward secrecy” that suggests an implicit security requirement. We could not
determine any other sections that would imply security requirements.
The wording of the above section suggests that all listed terms are defined in
IEC/TS 62351-2 [2]. This is not the case: [2] defines only some of these concepts.
In particular, “modification” and (perfect) “forward secrecy” are not defined. We
address the listed concepts in turn, starting from the ones which are defined.
Spoofing. The standard specifies that spoofing is defined through [2] as:
2.2.191 Spoof (from IEC/TS 62351-2 [2] p.39)
Pretending to be an authorized user and performing an unauthorized action.
[RFC 2828]
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While this definition references RFC 2828 [22], there is a difference, in that [22]
equates spoofing and masquerading, but does not reference unauthorized actions:
spoofing attack (from RFC 2828 [22])
(I) A synonym for “masquerade attack”.
where masquerade is defined in the RFC as
masquerade attack (from RFC 2828 [22])
a type of attack in which one system entity illegitimately poses as (assumes the
identity of) another entity. (see: spoofing attack.)
Thus, the RFC equates spoofing and masquerading. Analogously, the DNP3
standard directly relies on [2], which defines masquerading as
2.2.131 Masquerade (from IEC/TS 62351-2 [2] p.30
The pretence by an entity to be a different entity in order to gain unauthorized access.
[ATIS]
Here, ATIS [5] is a glossary from which this particular definition is taken.
Hence it seems that within the context of DNP3, spoofing and masquerading are
interchangeable, similar to the statements in RFC 2828. However, the definitions
in the DNP3 standard [4] are closer to [5] than to [22], since they additionally
include the aspect of unauthorized access/action. Note that the DNP3 standard
has no explicit concept of authorization; this seems out of the standard’s scope.
Replay
2.2.159 Replay Attack (from IEC/TS 62351-2 [2] p.35)
1. A masquerade which involves use of previously transmitted messages.
[ISO/IEC 9798-1:1997]
This is a verbatim copy of a similar section in the reference ISO/IEC 9798-
1:1997 [16], and suggests that replay is a special case of masquerading/spoofing.
Eavesdropping
2.2.92 Eavesdropping (from IEC/TS 62351-2 [2] p.25)
Passive wiretapping done secretly, i.e., without the knowledge of the originator or
the intended recipients of the communication. [RFC 2828]
This is a verbatim copy from the definition in the reference RFC 2828 [22].
However, DNP3 adds the specific restriction to the confidentiality of keys, as the
main purpose of the standard is to authenticate messages that are not confidential.
Modification There is no explicit definition: we interpret this as an integrity
requirement: adversaries must not be able to modify transmitted messages.
Perfect Forward Secrecy The general design text contains:
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5.4.10 Perfect forward secrecy (from IEEE 1815-2012 [3] p. 16)
This specification follows the security principle of perfect forward secrecy, as defined
in IEC/TS 62351-2. If a session key is compromised, this mechanism only puts data
from that particular session at risk, and does not permit an attacker to authenticate
data in future sessions.
Surprisingly, IEC/TS 62351-2 [2] does not mention the concept of (perfect)
forward secrecy. However, the informal explanation suggests that the loss of some
session keys should not affect authentication of future sessions with, presumably,
different session keys.
Adversary Capabilities The standard states that communications might be
performed over insecure channels, and this suggests the threat model includes
adversaries that can manipulate or insert messages.
The standard additionally states that “if update keys are entered or stored
on the device in an insecure fashion, the entire authentication mechanism is
compromised” ( [3, p. 21]). This suggests that some forms of compromise might
be considered (e.g., of session keys), but not the full compromise (in which all
stored data is compromised) of a party involved of a session.
3 Formal Model of SAv5 in Tamarin
Our modelling and analysis of Secure Authentication v5 used the Tamarin
security protocol verification tool [20]. Tamarin is a symbolic tool which supports
both falsification and unbounded verification of security protocols specified as
multiset rewriting systems with respect to (temporal) first-order properties. We
give a brief overview of Tamarin in Section 3.3, and an example of its syntax in
Appendix A.1; for more detail on the theory and use of Tamarin see [20] and
https://tamarin-prover.github.io.
3.1 Symbolic Modelling Assumptions
Symbolic analysis does not consider computational attacks on a protocol, instead
focusing on the logic of protocol interactions. This requires us to make assumptions
about the primitives used in the protocol, which restricts the power of the analysis.
We make the following assumptions:
– Dolev-Yao Adversary: the adversary controls the network.
– Symbolic Representation: information is contained in terms. Any party (in-
cluding the adversary) can either know a term in its entirety, or not know it,
a party cannot learn e.g. a single bit of a term.
– Perfect Cryptography: we assume that the cryptographic primitives used are
perfect. This means that e.g. an adversary can only learn the term m from
the symmetrically encrypted {|m |}sk term if it knows the key, k.
– Hash Functions: we assume that hash functions are one-way and injective.
– Randomness: we assume all freshly generated random terms are unpredictable,
and unique (no two fresh terms generated separately are equal).
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Figure 5. A simplified version of the user’s state machine as defined in the standard,
excluding error transitions and the monitoring direction of the Critical ASDU Authen-
tication Protocol . Note that although many transitions occur from the same state, they
are conditional on additional state that is not represented in the state machine as
described by the standard.
3.2 Complexity of the Protocol
Each of the protocols within Secure Authentication v5 are individually straight
forward; however, much more complexity becomes apparent when they interact.
To give an indication of the state machines, see Figure 5 for a diagram showing the
state transitions performed by the user. The system starts in state 0; each node
is the state the user is in before it executes a rule along one of the outgoing edges.
These edges are labelled with the name of the rule which the user executes during
the transition into another state (these names are the same as in the Message
Sequence Charts). This diagram demonstrates how multiple loops can occur in
many different orders, with very little determined structure, and how little of the
relevant state is represented by the standard’s state machines. Each protocol can
loop many times (below certain large thresholds), making the possible routes
through the state machines and state-space very large and complex indeed.
As there is stored data associated with each of these states, we do not get
injective correspondence with the named states from the SAv5 specification.
3.3 Protocol Modelling in Tamarin
In Tamarin, protocols are modelled as a collection of labelled multiset rewriting
rules; these consist of Premises, Actions (or labels), and Conclusions. The premises
of a rule are facts which must exist in the multiset prior to the rule’s execution,
and conclusions are facts which are added to the multiset by executing the rule.
Individual facts may be either linear or persistent; if a fact is linear then it is
consumed when used in the premise of a rule. Actions are used to label execution
traces: when a rule is executed at a particular point, the actions are associated
to that time point, and can be referenced to describe properties of traces.
All three sub-protocols’ rules and interactions were modelled as rules in
Tamarin’s operational semantics; the final model comprises 30 multiset rewriting
rules in ~450 SLoC. The model and associated theorems are contained in the
file dnp3.m4, which can be found at [1]. We give an example of a SAv5 rule
modelled in Tamarin in Appendix A.1.
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The state machines described in [3] (corresponding to the transitions discussed
in Section 2.2) capture very little of the protocol logic, as the allowed transitions
depend more on values in memory than on the current state machine ‘state’. As
an example, the outstation remains entirely in the named state “Security Idle”
throughout the Update Key Change Protocol ; however, the outstation can only
respond to certain messages from the user dependent on data from previously
sent or received terms. Our Tamarin models include this much larger range of
transitions, as well as their associated errors and timeouts.
4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Modelling the Threat Model and Security Properties
In Tamarin, security properties are modelled as (temporal) first-order logical
formulae. These are evaluated over so-called action traces that are generated by
the protocol model. Protocol rules have as their second parameter a multiset
of actions; when the rewrite system makes a transition based on a ground rule
instance, the rule’s actions are appended to the action trace. Thus, the action
trace can be considered to be a log of the actions defined by the transition rules,
in a particular execution. The modeller chooses what is logged, and this enables
us to log appropriate events that enable the specification of the desired properties.
Modelling Adversary Capabilities As described in Section 2.3, the standard
assumes that communication channels are not secure, so we assume the worst:
the adversary fully controls the network, i.e., it can drop and inject arbitrary
messages, and eavesdrop all sent messages. This model is known within symbolic
security verification as the network part of the Dolev-Yao attacker model.
Based on the general principle of perfect forward secrecy, we additionally
provide the adversary with the ability to compromise some (but not all) keys. In
particular, when considering authentication or confidentiality properties, we will
allow the adversary to compromise all session keys except for the CDSK/MDSK
used for this particular critical ASDU. As a result, our model also considers any
attacks on the authentication property that are based on the compromise of
(different) earlier session keys, as described in the standard.
Modelling the Security Properties We now revisit each of the properties
defined in Section 2.3 and describe how we interpret them for modelling purposes,
resulting in three properties called AUTH1, AUTH2, and CONF.
Spoofing: AUTH1 The main security goal of SAv5 seems to be to prevent
spoofing, i.e. to ensure that all critical ASDUs originate from the intended parties.
This is classically specified as an authentication property. However, there is no
canonical notion of authentication; instead, there are many subtly different forms
(See, e.g. [18]). In this particular case, we choose a form of agreement, i.e., if
party A receives a critical ASDU, then this exact message was sent by some
B who agrees on the message and some additional parameters. In particular,
the additional parameters we include here are the mode (“aggressive” or “non-
aggressive”) and the direction (“control” or “monitoring”).
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One complication is that classical authentication properties link identities: if
Alice receives a message, she associates the sender with an identity (say, Bob), and
the authentication property then encodes that Bob sent the message. However, in
the case of SAv5, there are not always clear identities for parties, e.g., outstations.
Instead, pairs of users and outstations are effectively linked through their initial
(pre-distributed) update keys. Thus, the best we can hope to prove is that upon
receiving a message, apparently from someone that initially had update key k,
then the message was indeed sent by someone whose initial update key was k.
We thus model the following (relatively weak) agreement property, which we
refer to as AUTH1: if an outstation or a user receives an Authentication Reply
or Aggressive Mode Request message m in a mode x (where x is either “aggressive”
or “non-aggressive”) in direction y (where y is “control” or “monitoring”), then
this message m was sent in mode x for direction y by a party that had the same
initial (pre-distributed) update key.
We consider the following adversary capabilities for this property: the ad-
versary can compromise all session keys (CDSK or MDSK) except for the one
used in the message m. This covers the “perfect forward secrecy” general principle.
Additionally, we allow the adversary to compromise all update keys other than
that used to assign the current session keys.
Replay: AUTH2 Classically, replay refers to multiplicity: if Bob apparently
completes N sessions with Alice, then Alice in fact ran at least N sessions with Bob.
Phrased differently, an adversary should not be able to complete more sessions
with Bob than Alice actually ran. However, the definitions in the standard suggest
that replay should be interpreted as a special case of masquerading (and thus
spoofing), which uses previously transmitted messages. From this we infer that
some form of multiplicity or recentness is intended to be part of the anti-spoofing
guarantee. We encode this as AUTH2, which is strictly stronger than AUTH1.
Thus, AUTH2 additionally models so-called injective authentication, which
captures the classical notion of replay prevention. Informally, it states that for
each received message, there is a unique message sent. Thus, an attack in which
an adversary tricks Bob into receiving a message twice which Alice only sent
once violates the property.
Eavesdropping: CONF Since the standard considers non-confidential ASDU
messages, there is no clear confidentiality requirement. However, the authentica-
tion guarantees can only be satisfied against an active adversary if the relevant
keys remain confidential. Hence, a subgoal is to require confidentiality of keys.
This should in particular hold against weaker adversaries, such as eavesdroppers.
We note that the prevention of spoofing attacks (as per the first requirement)
implies that all the relevant keys (Authority Key, Update Key, and MDSK or
CDSK) are confidential with respect to eavesdroppers. If they are not, the active
adversary can trivially use them to spoof a message. We can still model these
confidentiality requirements separately. This is useful for protocols that do not
satisfy the authentication guarantees directly.
If the user chooses, encrypts, and transmits a new Session Key (e.g., CDSK 1) it
is important that the adversary does not learn it. However, it is equally important
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that the adversary cannot e.g. block the transmission of CDSK 1, impersonate the
user, and transmit different, adversary-chosen keys (e.g. CDSK 2) to the outstation.
In the second case, CDSK 1 might still be secret, but the adversary can still issue
‘authentic’ commands to the outstation, HMAC’d with CDSK 2. Since there are
different key types, CONF is modelled as a set of confidentiality properties, one
of each type of key and each perspective (role).
We now give an example of a confidentiality property from our analysis; this
property models the secrecy of Session Keys from the outstation’s point of view:
lemma sessionkey_secrecy_outst:
"not ( Ex AK #r . AuthorityKeyReveal( AK ) @ r )
==>
( All id UK CDSK MDSK #i.
not ( Ex #r . UpdateKeyReveal( UK ) @ r )
& not ( Ex #r . CDSKReveal( CDSK ) @ r )
& not ( Ex #r . MDSKReveal( MDSK ) @ r )
& received_sess_keys( id, UK, CDSK, MDSK ) @ i
==> not ( Ex #j . K( CDSK ) @ j ) & not ( Ex #j. K( MDSK ) @ j ) )"
Informally this says, “assuming no authority keys have been compromised, if
the outstation has received some new un-revealed session keys encrypted under
an un-revealed update key, then the adversary cannot derive those new session
keys”. Most key-secrecy lemmas are of this form.
Modification. As stated before, this is not defined in the standard, and we
interpret it as an integrity requirement. As such, it will be covered by our
authentication guarantees AUTH1 and AUTH2.
Perfect forward secrecy. As noted in Section 2.3, this general principle
indicates an intended resilience against the compromise of other session keys,
and is covered by our adversary capabilities for the three properties.
4.2 Analysis in Tamarin
Tamarin makes use of backwards reasoning, starting from trace constraints, and
building up further constraints from the possible solutions to an open proof goal.
This has the invariant that all complete traces that fulfil the original constraints
also fulfil at least one of the new sets of constraints. For example, if the current
state contains a rule with an unsolved premise fact, then when Tamarin solves
this premise it splits the current state into several states, each containing one of
the possible conclusions which may have been the source of that fact.
To prove that a particular property holds in all traces (such as “In all traces, X
is preceded by Y”), Tamarin begins with the trace constraints from its negation
(“There exists a trace in which X is not preceded by Y”). Goals are solved until
either there is a case with no goals remaining, which is a completed trace and
thus a counter-example to the property, or all possible states are contradictory.
In the latter case, this returns a proof that no trace can satisfy the constraints of
the negated property, and thus the property holds in all traces.
This backwards reasoning makes Tamarin very efficient in many protocols,
but is ill-suited to a na¨ıve model of the SAv5 protocol. The specification relies
not only on shared state between each constituent sub-protocol, but also a shared
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state machine which dictates which transitions are allowable at particular times.
Further, the majority of state transitions occur from and return to the same state,
Security Idle. Na¨ıvely, an attempt to solve a premise requiring the Security
Idle state may find that many rules are potential sources, and attempt to solve
each of these possibilities separately. Worse, many may introduce new unsolved
premises that also require the Security Idle state, creating a loop.
The key to analysing a protocol like this is to identify invariants over particular
transitions and prioritize solving for the source of these as necessary. For example,
an outstation running the Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol is making use
of session keys that were set during the last Session Key Update Protocol (rule
S4, as labelled in Figure 2) and are invariant in all other rules. We therefore add
a premise to any rule making use of the session keys so that it directly relies
on the current “session key invariant”, represented by a persistent fact that is
output when the session keys are changed, along with a fresh identifier so that it
cannot unify to any other session key invariant. In solving the premises, we can
prioritize the sources of the current invariants, as the properties of the current
protocol often depend only on the circumstances around the relevant invariants.
In the Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol example, the authentication
properties depend on the properties of the last Session Key Update and the
original pairing of the user to outstation, and in the Aggressive Mode, on the last
generated challenge data. Each of these is included as an invariant. When proving
that all traces have the AUTH1 property, this allows Tamarin immediately to
solve for the source of the invariants, which adds constraints to, for example,
where the session keys were generated and assigned.
4.3 Results
Section 4.1 described how the specification requires the protocol be resilient to
Spoofing, Modification, Replay, and Eavesdropping, and how these properties
translated into more formal security properties AUTH1, AUTH2, and CONF.
Our analysis in Tamarin has formally verified all three of these properties
for our model of DNP3: Secure Authentication v5; in particular, they hold for
any (unbounded) number of sessions and loop iterations. These results can be
automatically verified by Tamarin from the model and properties in dnp3.m4,
which can be found at [1]. On a modern PC (2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 from 2012
with 8GB RAM), these theorems in total prove in ~1m 33s. We additionally
proved several sanity checking properties, e.g., to show that our model correctly
allows for expected behaviours.
Security Property Result
AUTH1 verified
AUTH2 verified
CONF verified
As stated in the introduction, our results seemingly contradict an attack
claimed in previous analysis; we will return to this in detail in Section 6.
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5 Recommendations
Our analysis, while succesful in showing that the main properties hold, also
naturally leads to several recommendations. To aid clarity of implementation,
to avoid possible misinterpretation, and to allow the protocol to meet stronger
security guarantees, we propose the following changes to future versions of the
specification. We discuss the reasoning behind these recommendations in more
detail in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
Recommendations Based upon Modelling and Analysis:
– Update Key Change messages (g120v13) should contain a clear indication
of intended recipient (i.e. outstation ID). This would allow for a stronger
authentication property that only relies on the secrecy of the Authority key,
not additionally on the secrecy of the new update key.
– The specification must clarify the use of Challenge Sequence Numbers:
• It is not clear whether CSQ values (per direction) should be kept on a
per Master-Outstation pair basis, or whether each device should keep
one universal CSQ value (per direction).
• The specification must clarify whether recipients of CSQ values from
the network (whether Responder or Challenger) should expect CSQ
values to be strictly increasing. The sender’s behaviour (whether in an
Authentication Challenge, Authentication Reply, or Aggressive Mode
Request) is clear, but it is not clear under which conditions a device
should accept a CSQ as valid from another party. If CSQ values are not
required to be strictly increasing, then replay attacks of Aggressive Mode
Requests become possible.
Recommendations Based upon Best Cryptographic Practice:
– The specification should strongly recommend that devices support asymmetric
cryptography, rather just than symmetric key-transport. This should be
recommended for both the Update Key Change and Session Key Update
Protocols. Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) would allow stations
to benefit from the added security of asymmetric cryptography, without
significantly increasing the total amount of data transmitted. Asymmetric
cryptography crucially only requires each secret key to be in one location,
and ECC is viable on low-power devices [15].
– Deprecate HMAC-SHA-1. The SHA-1 algorithm is dangerously weak, and a
collision has been found [23]. HMAC-SHA-256 should be required at minimum.
Other Recommendations:
– The standard must clarify how recipients of messages should parse them,
and the standard must clearly and precisely state how recipients should
calculate HMACs (e.g. to compare to received Authentication Replies and
Aggressive Mode Requests). This must clarify which Sequence Numbers (for
both Challenges and Key Changes) should be valid under which conditions,
and which Challenge Data should be valid in which situations.
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– The standard must clearly state when various data should be kept until (e.g.
Challenge Data), when it should be overwritten, and how many previous
instances of this data should be kept per User-Outstation pair.
6 Related Work
Previous work has considered the broader security of DNP3, or, in contrast, only
analysed SAv5’s Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol in isolation.
East et al. 2009 provide an interesting and thorough taxonomy of the
different types of attack against DNP3 in [14], but as this paper was published
before SAv5 was standardised, it does not consider Secure Authentication.
Tawde et al. 2015 propose a ‘bump-in-the-wire’ solution for the key-
management and encryption of critical packets within IEC/TS 62351-5 (the
protocol suite upon which DNP3: SAv5 is based), but provide no formal analysis
of this addition or the existing protocols [24].
Attacks Claimed: Amoah et al., 2014 & 2016 use Colored Petri-Nets
to model and analyse both the non-aggressive and aggressive modes of this sub-
protocol, discovering a denial of service attack in the non-aggressive mode [9], and
a “replay attack” when the aggressive and non-aggressive modes are combined [7].
Both papers only consider the Critical ASDU protocol in isolation.
According to [7, p.353], the attack works as follows: after a non-aggressive
critical ASDU request (A1 in Figure 3), the attacker blocks the Authentication
Challenge message (A2) to the user, and sends a new one with the same challenge
data, but with an artificially incremented CSQ. The user creates an Authentication
Reply (A3, containing an HMAC) with this incremented CSQ value, which the
outstation now rejects (A4). The attacker then replays this Authentication Reply
with the critical ASDU prepended, to match the format of an Aggressive Mode
Request (without modifying the HMAC), which, they claim, the outstation
will now accept: valid Aggresive Mode Requests should have both the same
challenge data as the last sent Authentication Challenge message, and a CSQ
value incremented for each request sent since that challenge. As the user never
sent an Aggressive Mode Request (only a non-aggressive request), [7] claims this
violates agreement.
This attack does not work, as an outstation will not accept a non-aggressive
mode message replayed into the Aggressive Mode. Our reasoning is as follows:
HMACs within an Aggressive Mode Request must be calculated over “The
entire Application Layer fragment that this object is included in, including the
Application Layer header, all objects preceding this one, and the object header and
object prefix for this object” [3, p.742, Table A-9]. An Aggressive Mode HMAC
must therefore include the “Object Header g120v3 Authentication Aggressive
Mode Request”, and the “Object Header g120v9 Authentication MAC”; these
two object headers must both be included in the HMAC calculation [3, A.45.9,
p.741]. In contrast, the calculation of an HMAC within an Authentication Reply
message (g120v2) from a non-aggressive mode request contains no such Aggressive
Mode objects or headers. Assuming the attacker cannot successfully modify the
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HMAC without access to the session key, an HMAC for an Aggressive Mode
Request will never match one calculated from the non-aggressive mode, regardless
of whether the CSQ values and challenge data match.
We modelled this ‘attack’ in the file dnp3-aggressive-amoah-attack.spthy.
For this to succeed, we had to under-approximate the original model significantly
compared to the specification. Notably, in this model, we had to remove anything
from the specification stating or implying the mode in both HMACs, as well
as removing checks on the relationship between the CSQ in the body of the
Aggressive Mode Request, and the CSQ within the Authentication Challenge
included in the HMAC [3, pp.211 & 742].
We conclude that this claimed attack is an artefact of a model that is too
coarse, and is not possible in faithful implementations of the standard.
Amoah et al. then make the novel contribution of a method for Critical ASDU
Authentication within the Broadcast or Unicast setting, in [8]. Amoah’s 2016
thesis [6] supplements these papers by providing greater detail of the modelling
and analysis of the Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol .
7 Conclusions
In this work, we have performed the most comprehensive symbolic modelling and
analysis yet of the DNP3 Secure Authentication v5 protocol; this analysis has
considered all of the constituent sub-protocols, including cross protocol attacks.
We make use of novel modelling techniques in Tamarin, by identifying
invariants in DNP3’s state transitions to cope with analysis of the protocol’s
inherent complexity, extensive state, and unbounded loops and sessions.
Our findings notably contradict claimed results by earlier analyses; in par-
ticular, our findings show that the attack claimed in [7] is not possible in the
standard as defined.
While our analysis naturally leads to a number of recommendations for
improving future versions of DNP3, we conclude that the core protocol of the
standard meets its stated security goals if implemented correctly, increasing
much-needed confidence in this security-critical building block of power grids.
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Appendix A
A.1 Tamarin example rule
There are a few special facts used in Tamarin. The Dolev-Yao adversary is
modelled through special In and Out facts, which respectively ask the adversary
to provide, or provide to the adversary, the term in the fact. Additionally, there
is a Fr fact to represent symbolically generating a random value.
Example 1. The following rule is an example of a multiset rewriting protocol
rule in Tamarin’s syntax. This is an abstracted implementation of the A3 ‘Send
Authentication Reply’ message rule, in the control direction, from the Critical
ASDU Authentication Protocol described in Section 2.2.2.
rule A3_C:
let AC = < CSQ, USR, CD >
AR = < CSQ, USR, hmac(<CSQ,AC,ASDU>, CDSK) > in
[ UserState(USR, OS, MDSK, CDSK, LastControlChallenge, [...], ’SecurityIdle’)
, In(AC) ]
--[ SentASDU(USR, OS, AR, ’NonAggressiveMode’, ’ControlDirection’)
, UsingSessionKeys(CDSK,MDSK)
]->
[ UserState(USR, OS, MDSK, CDSK, AC, [...], ’SecurityIdle’)
, Out(AR) ]
The A3 rule defines the behaviour when a user (identified by USR) receives a
challenge in response to a critical ASDU sent to an outstation (here identified by
OS). The challenge message AC contains a CSQ sequence number, the USR identifier,
and some challenge data CD. The user generates a reply, AR, including an HMAC
of the challenge message, AC, and the ASDU under the relevant session key.
In the Tamarin implementation of this rule above, the premises require a
linear fact UserState containing terms representing stored values of the user,
and the user is required to be in the SecurityIdle state. They also require a
message from the network, containing three terms, the second of which must be
equal to the user identifier USR in the UserState fact.
The actions contain two labels to refer to later, one recording that the user
USR sent an authenticated reply AR intended for the outstation OS, in the non-
aggressive mode and in the control direction. The other records the session keys
that the user had in their state at the time of the rule’s execution.
The conclusions of the rule output an updated user state, in which the
LastControlChallenge used for aggressive mode is overwritten by the new
challenge just received, as well as the message to the network AR defined above.
A.2 Update Key Change Protocol Outstation ID.
Update Key Change messages (g120v13) should contain a clear indication of
intended recipient (i.e. outstation ID).
In the Update Key Change Protocol , the Update Key Change object (g120v13)
contains the KSQ, User Name, update key, and outstation Challenge Data, but
not an outstation identifier (in contrast to the asymmetric version in g120v14).
Thus, an outstation cannot ensure the Authority agrees on the outstation identity
when receiving a newly encrypted update key. It is only through the HMAC
in the Update Key Confirmation message (g120v15) that the outstation can
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authenticate the destination of the update key, but this HMAC is computed
under that same new update key being distributed. Concretely, there is potential
to attack the Update Key Change Protocol without knowledge of the Authority’s
key using only knowledge of the new update key. The adversary can present a
challenge from outstation A to the user as if it were from outstation B, receive
an Update Key Change object intended for outstation B encrypted under the
Authority key, and recompute the Update Key Confirmation message so that it
is incorrectly accepted by outstation A.
This has only minor impact, as the update keys are assumed to be secret, and
the attack requires two outstations to be running the Update Key Change Protocol
with the same user concurrently. Nonetheless, it implies achieving agreement on
a new update key requires a weaker adversary than is strictly necessary.
A.3 Modelling choices, and issues with the specification
The finer details of SAv5’s sub-protocols in [3] and [4] are very often unclear, under-
specified, and open to interpretation. We give a couple of indicative examples of
the larger issues we encountered, and how we chose to model them.
Challenge Sequence Numbers: The specification states that parties should
keep one CSQ per direction, and not on a per-user basis [3, p.211-g]. It also
implies that parties should keep count of the number of Authentication Replies
and Aggressive Mode Requests it has sent since the last Authentication Challenge
it has received, on a per-user basis [3, p.211-d]. The purpose of the CSQ is to
match messages, and to ensure that replays are not possible [3, pp.207 & 211].
Instead of modelling precisely as described, we keep one CSQ per user, per
direction (control and monitoring). If we do not do this, the universal CSQ values
in a model must depend on all of the state machines running from the same
station, which makes analysis infeasible.
Modelling CSQs in this manner is analagous to the specification: both keep
a single value which allows the Challenger to check whether received messages
contain the correct CSQ or not; the specification keeps a universal total and a
difference on a per-user basis, we simply keep a per-user total; both interpretations
require this incrementing value to be in Authentication Replies or Aggressive
Mode Requests, to prevent replay attacks.
The specification has clear rules for when the sender of a CSQ should increment
this value [3, p.211], but nothing about when a recipient should accept the value;
it is not clear whether a received CSQ (e.g. in an Authentication Challenge)
can be any value, whether it must be strictly increasing, or whether it must be
precisely one higher than its last seen value. In our model, recipients of CSQ
values check that they are strictly increasing.
Sequence Number Rollovers: CSQs and KSQs explicitly rollover to 0
after they reach 4,294,967,295 (232 − 1); what a recipient of a rolled-over CSQ
does is not defined. If CSQs are not strictly increasing, this is not an issue. If
not, the way rollovers are handled needs to be done so correctly, or this might
allow (very slow) replay attacks. We avoid this issue by not modelling rollovers.
Challenge Data: When parties should set and erase certain values, and how
many historic values parties should save is not clear. Challenge data from previous
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messages is saved to enable alternate modes, e.g. saving the last Authentication
Challenge (AC) in the (non-aggressive) Critical ASDU Authentication Protocol
so that its Challenge Data can be used in Aggressive Mode Requests.
It is not clear when this should be stored, and when each party should erase
its previous ‘last sent challenge’. As an illustration: after the outstation (here the
Challenger) has sent an AC, the user might not receive this AC message; if the
user gets bored of waiting for an AC (which might never appear), it might send
an Aggressive Mode Request with a critical ASDU. The user knows that it is to
construct this request with the last AC it received, which will not be the same
as the last AC the outstation sent: should the outstation accept this Aggressive
Mode Request? Figure 7-28 of [3] implies it should, (if in the ‘WaitingForReply’
state) but what about after an invalid reply is received, or a message times out?
How to construct HMACs from the user’s side is clear (both for the non-
aggressive and aggressive modes of CAAP), but it is not so clear how to work
out what construes a valid HMAC from the outstation’s side.
We modelled this as follows: after sending an Authentication Challenge
message, the outstation saves the challenge it is currently expecting to receive
in an Authentication Reply. Upon timeout, other error, or successful reply, this
challenge gets saved as the last sent challenge. This means an outstation can
receive an aggressive mode request between the Authentication Challenge and a
timeout, and still prevent it from being over-written.
21
